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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
MERRILL HOLBROOK, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
vs. 
LOUISE HOLBROOK, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
Case No. 
729& 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Respondent feels that Appellant has sufficiently and 
fairly stated the facts of the case in so far as said state-
ment is confined to dates, events and figures, but Respond-
ent differs with Appellant upon his construction of the 
rulings of the court below as the same are set forth in said 
Statement of Facts, and differs with Appellant's statement 
on two points, to wit: 
1. Respondent states the fact to be that Appellant 
was sentenced to the county jail for a period of thirty days; 
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said sentence to be suspended upon payment of $645.00 to 
the Clerk of the Court (Tr. p. 52). 
2. Respondent further states the fact to be that the 
court did consider Appellant's petition for a modification of 
a decree but did not find facts sufficient to justify a modi-
fication thereof (Tr. p. 52). 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
The contention that the court erred in its finding as 
to Appellant's earnings of $435.00 per month is without 
merit. 
There isn't any testimony upon which the court must 
find, based upon a preponderance of evidence, that Ap-
pellant's mother owns the home and receives the rents and 
profits thereof. These is a preponderance of testimony to 
the contrary. The deed to Appellant's mother was for his 
accommodation (Tr. p. 53). Appellant will have the home 
when the mortgage is paid (Tr. p. 43). Appellant has the 
duty to pay the mortgage (Tr. p. 38). Appellant manages the 
home (Tr. p. 45). Appellant used rents for car payments 
(Tr. p. 44). Appellant's employees receive and receipt for 
the rents at Appellant's place of work (Tr. p. 45). Appel-
lant gets and disburses the rents (Tr. p. 45). 
It seems pertinent to point out that Appellant does 
not cite as error the fact that the lower court found that he 
was able to pay $150.00 each month, for it is the law of Utah, 
or so Respondent believes, that inability to pay the sums 
provided by the decree is a defense to a contempt action. 
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Appellant cites only as error the lack of a Finding that he 
had $645.00 on January 11, 1949 with which to pay arrears. 
This implied admission of ability to comply with the decree 
found in the failure to cite the ruling on ability as error 
is an admission that Appellant earns more than the $300.00 
he specified to be his salary, or has available for any use he 
cares to make of it a sum in excess of $300.00 per month. 
All the foregoing, together with the repeated evasions 
or attempts to evade examination of his actions, as they 
appear throughout the testimony, justified the court in 
feeling that Appellant was not entitled to belief and did 
have the income found by the court which was $435.00 less 
house expense. 
2. 
The court did not err in holding the defendant to be in 
contempt. 
Appellant in his assignment of errors states that the 
court did not find that Appellant was able to pay the $6415.00 
in arrears, and that the contempt order is invalid in the 
absence of such a finding. 
Counsel for Respondent submits that Appellant either 
reads or states the law incorrectly. 
This is not a case where a party is incarcerated until 
he performs. The order. is not to that effect. The order is 
for a term certain-thirty days-suspended if Appellant 
wants or is able to secure a suspension thereof. 
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The order of the court in this matter was punitive 
rather than purposive-to use the terms of Appellant. At 
page 51 of the Transcript the court said 
"And I hold you in contempt for not having 
paid." 
At page 53 the court said 
"He is in contempt of this court for not living 
up to the decree." 
The court then imposed sentence and stated terms of suspen-
sion. 
Respondent believes there is a distinction between cases 
where a contemnor is lodged in a jail indefinitely until he 
pays or performs and cases where a contemnor is sentenced 
to a term certain and subject to suspension on performance 
of a condition such as payment of a sum due the other party. 
In the first class the intent is completely purposive and the 
latter it is primarily punitive-as punishment for a past 
act. 
The cases of Snook v. Snook, 188 Pac. 502 and Watson 
v. Watson, 72 Utah 218, 269 Pac. 775, cited by Appellant, 
are both cases where the contemnor was given an indefinite 
term to continue until he performed-a term amounting 
to life perhaps. These cases are entirely purposive and do 
not seem to be in point here in view of the specific sentence. 
Respondent respectfully represents the law applicable 
to this case to be as follows: 
If imprisonment is to continue until payment is made, 
present ability to pay must be shown. If imprisonment is 
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for a term certain as punishment for a past act of contempt 
or for past acts, then present ability to pay is not a consider-
ation. That, even if ability to pay is a necessary adjunct to 
a valid contempt sentence, a contemnor who voluntarily or 
contumaciously brings on himself the inability to obey 
cannot avail himself of such inability as a defense. 
Galland v. Galland, 44 Cal. 475, 13 Am. St. Rep. 
167 
State v. District Cour·t, 37 Mont. 485, 97 Pac. 
841 
Staples v. Staples, 87 'Vis. 592, 58 N. W. 1036, 
24 L. R. A. 433 
Appellant has not suffered a decrease in earnings, but 
an increase. He paid nothing on the mortgage on the house 
nor on repairs in July or August nor for the support of his 
four children. He thereafter elected to repair, instead of 
support, as provided by the decree, and after repairs elected 
to buy a car instead of support his four children as provided 
by the decree. 
Presuming that Appellant ea~ns $300.00 and no more 
as he maintains, he obligates himself to pay $129 per month 
or 43% of his total earnings on a new Buick car because he 
has owned a car since he was eighteen and is not going to 
go without one any longer (Tr. p. 48). He gives no reason 
why he paid nothing whatsoever in July and August. Such 
sums as were paid were done so in violation of the decree 
requiring him to pay the same to the Clerk. 
In such cases of past acts constituting a disobedience 
of a decree and a term certain of imprisonment a punish-
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ment for said disobedience, can it be right or logical to say 
that the punishment is illegal or the sentence invalid if a 
suspension condition is attached to it? 
The burden of proving inability to pay, if ability to pay 
is necessary to sustain a contempt order under all circum-
stances, is on Appellant and not on Respondent as main-
tain~d by Appellant in his brief at page 7. 
State v. Cook, 66 Ohio 566, 64 N. E. 5-67, 58 
L. R. A. 625 
Fowler v. Fowler, 61 Okla. 280, 161 Pac. 227, 
L. R. A. 1917 C 89. 
Further, that present lack of money as a defense for 
failure to pay past installments is not available to a party 
if there has been any material income during the period 
of failure to comply with the decree. 
Staples v. Staples, 87 Wis. 592, 58 N. W. 1036, 
24 L. R. A. 433 
Tolman v. Leonard, 6,6 App. D. C. 224 
Barclay v. Barclay, 184 Ill. 471, 56 N. E. 821 
Deen v. Bloomer, 191 Ill. 416, 61 N. E. 131 
Lake v. Judge, 172 Mich. 660, 138 N. W. 249 
Shaffner v. Shaffner, 212 Ill. 492, 72 N. E. 447 
Cahzin v. Cahzin, 112 N. Y. S. 525. 
3. 
Reasonably construed, the order of the trial judge is 
to the effect that changed financial circumstances of the 
wife is not such a change in this case as to be considered 
sufficient for a modification of the decree. 
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Appellant in his brief appears to complain of the lower 
court on the following items : 
1. The court refused to hear evidence regarding change 
in financial circumstances of wife. 
2. That the court held that change in financial condi-
tion of wife was not a matter to be considered at all in de-
termining whether there should be a reduction. 
Respondent contends that the court did not refuse to 
hear evidence. The court did refuse to hear irrelevant evi-
dence (Tr. p. 21) on the purchase of a home and type of 
home (Tr. p. 22). Respondent was aware that a petition 
for reduction was being heard concurrently and opened the 
question on direct examination of Respondent (Tr. p. 9 et 
seq.). Appellant did not ever pursue the subject on his cross 
examination of Respondent. The testimony shows that the 
court was fully informed on the earnings of Respondent. 
A reasonable interpretation of the lower court's views 
as set forth on page 23 of the Transcript does not appear to 
support the construction placed on it by Appellant. The 
court stressed the needs of the children, then the earnings 
of Appellant, and held that, in the absence of a change of 
either of these factors, he would not consider change in the 
circumstances of the mother, Respondent. Respondent con-
tends that the court, by inference, held that if the only 
change to be shown was the change in financial circum-
stances of the mother no reduction would be made. That in 
his discretion such a change, and nothing more, would not 
warrant a reduction. 
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Respondent contends that such a position is a correct 
one and is supported by law. 
Respondent admits that a change in the financial 
circumustances of the mother is a factor that a court may 
consider on questions of modification of decrees for support 
money, but Respondent hasn't found a case that holds that 
the decree must be modified when the mother becomes em-
ployed after the entry of the decree. The citations of Ap-
pellant are significant, not for that they hold but for what 
Appellant has withheld from them in his discussion of them 
in his brief. In Lines v. Lines, a minor child reaching 
majority, a remarried father and a decree providing for a 
graduated scale were matters in addition to mother's em-
ployment; In Sullivan v. Sullivan the father's health had 
become impaired, he was unemployed, a male child was of 
age and self supporting, were factors in addition to mother's 
employment; in Caprio v. Caprio the mother had remarried, 
had income, and her husband had consented to share sup-
port of child with her were also factors considered in ad-
dition to wife's employment; In Kavanaugh v. Kavana'ltgh 
the mother was employed, children were grown and em-
ployed, father had remarried a woman who couldn't work. 
The facts in the cases cited by Appellant are so different 
from the case of Appellant that they serve the Respondent 
and take this case out of the scope of the principle contended 
for. 
Respondent contends that a principle has no application 
to a matter unless the facts upon which it is based are 
analogous to those at hand. Respondent also contends that 
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employment of the mother, as the sole fact or factor con-
stituting a change of circumstances between the parties sub-
sequent to the decree, is not such a change in circumstances 
and conditions as to permit, as a matter of law, a modifica-
tion of the decree pursuant to the provisions of Section 
40-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1943. Remarriage of mother 
is not such a change permitted by Section 40-3-5. To society 
and to women, marriage and employment are synonymous, 
each being the two most frequent means of existence to 
women \vith the less fortunate employing the latter means. 
An unmarried employed mother received a monthly sum in 
cash. A remarried unemployed mother receives the equiv-
alent but not in cash. It seems to be a distinction without a 
difference to arrive at a different result in the two cases. 
In the case of Rock'toood v. Rockwood, quoted by Ap-
pellant, a careful reading of that case leads to the con-
clusion that the ability of the mother to support is not such 
a change that would warrant a modification. Appellant 
contends and Respondent agrees that it is probably an open 
question in this state as to whether or not the mother's 
ability acquired subsequently to the decree is such a change 
as to warrant a modification. Respondent questions the 
reasonableness of the Appellant's interpretation of the 
Rockwood case set forth in his brief at page 13. It is sub-
mitted that the court in the Rockwood case meant to say 
that the mother's employment, if shown, would not have 
inured to the benefit of the father by way of reduction of 
support money. 
Respondent submits that the duty of the father to 
support is measured by his financial and social status after 
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the decree and not by the financial or social status of wife, 
nor by their combined financial condition before the decree, 
Butle1· v. Butler, 261n S. W. 415; that the responsibility for 
rearing and training children rests with the mother and the 
duty to provide means for maintenance and education is 
with the father, Cowley v. Cowley, 202 Pac. 10, 59 Utah 80; 
that there may be departures from the aforesaid rules, but 
each departure therefrom must stand on its own merits, 
Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 35 A. (2d) 691; that subsequent 
employment of former wife may be a circumstance that 
might justify a modification of allowance for support, as · 
a matter of judicial discretion, if there were appealing 
equities in former husband's situation, Morris v. Morris, 
(Neb.) 290 N. W. 720; and that no such appealing equity 
is present in the instant case as to warrant the modification 
requested. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent says that this matter is one of equity and 
the whole record may be viewed, and when so viewed the 
judgment and orders of the lower court should be affirmed 
as correct in the result reached by said court. 
Respectfully s4bmitted, 
KEITH BROWNE, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON, 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
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